Supposing that Player 1's computational power is higher than that of Player 2, we give three examples of different kinds of public signal about the state of a two-person zero-sum game with symmetric incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game) where Player 1 due to his computational power learns the state of the game meanwhile it is impossible for Player 2. That is, the game with incomplete information on both sides becomes a game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2. Thus we demonstrate that information about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players.
Games with incomplete information on one side as games with incomplete information on both sides and asymmetric computational resources
Introduction
The literature on repeated games with incomplete information usually assumes that players have unlimited computational capacity. Since in practice this assumption does not hold, it is important to study whether and how its absence affects the predictions of the theory. We consider zero-sum games of players with limited computational capacity, and discuss how these limitations may affect the information structure of the game. We show how difference in computation resources may give rise to informational asymmetry in an otherwise symmetric game.
Our model of limited computation resources is similar to the model of Abraham Neyman [1] , [2] . The strategies available to players are limited to finite automata of different sizes.
Starting with the seminal papers by Rubinstein [3] and by Abreu, Rubinstein [4] there appeared a number of papers on repeated games where strategies of players are implemented by finite automata. These papers investigate properties of the set of equilibrium payoffs under this assumption. For an abundant bibliography on the subject see Hernández, Solan [5] .
We are interested in another aspect. Supposing that Player 1's computational power is higher than that of Player 2, we give three examples of different kinds of public signal about the state of a two-person zero-sum game with symmetric incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of game but know its probability) where Player 1 due to his computational power learns the state of the game meanwhile it would be impossible for Player 2.
In our examples each player chooses a finite automaton. The both chosen automata are given a signal depending on the state of the game. Intuitively it is clear that higher computational power of Player 1 may let him "know" the state of the game meanwhile it would be impossible for Player 2. That is, if Player 1 "computes" the state of the game with help of his computational resources and Player 2 does not, the game with incomplete information on both sides becomes a game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2.
Thus we demonstrate that knowledge of the state of a game may arise not only due to a private information (a private signal) but as a result of a public signal and computational resources of players.
In the first two examples both chosen automata are given a signal consisting of a string of 1's whose length depends on the state of the game. In the first example a signal is deterministic. In the second example a signal is random.
In the third example both chosen automata are given a random signal consisting of a string of 0's and 1's. The state of the game is determined by the value of the bit (0 or 1) of a certain fixed distance from the end of the string.
In the first example where a signal is deterministic Player 2 gets no new information on the state of the game. In the second and third examples of random signals Player 2 reestimates the probability of the state. Hence players are faced with a game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 where the posterior probability of the state known to both players is more accurate than the prior one.
Games under consideration
As our approach only deals with revealing the information about the state of the game before the game starts, the number of stages is irrelevant. So we are not concerned with repetition of a game and do not go beyond analysis of games which are played once.
We base our consideration on the classical setting of matrix games with incomplete information on one side and with incomplete information on both sides (see Harsanyi [6] , Aumann, Maschler [7] ). I. The case of symmetric incomplete information on both sides. Let A(p) denote the matrix game with incomplete information on both sides given by two square payoff matrices A 1 and A 2 . Before the game starts a chance move determines the "state of nature" k ∈ K = {1, 2} and therefore the payoff matrix A k : with probability p the matrix A 1 is played and with probability 1 − p the matrix A 2 is played. Both players know the probability p and do not know the result of the chance move.
As a matter of fact in such a game with incomplete information on both sides players are faced with the matrix game given by payoff matrix A(p) = pA 1 + (1 − p)A 2 . We will denote the matrix game given by payoff matrix B by the same symbol B. The value V alA(p) is a continuous function on p over the interval [0, 1] , where V alA(0) = V alA 2 and V alA(1) = V alA 1 as equity of probability p to 0 or 1 means that players know what game is played: if p = 0 then it is A 2 and if p = 1 then it is A 1 .
Note that the absence of information on a state of the game on the both sides may be profitable for one player and not profitable for another one. Consider a simple example: 2 × 2-matrices with V alA 1 = V alA 2 = 0 Let A asy (p) denote this game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2. Naturally in this game Player 1 could guarantee himself not less than in the game A(p). In any case he may play as though he "forgives" the obtained information. But usually it is profitable for him to use his knowledge of the state of the game. Demonstrate it for the example of matrices A 1 and A 2 given in the case I. As Player 1 knows exactly what game is played he chooses the first row if it is A 1 and the second row if it is A 2 . The best reply of Player 2 who has no information on the state is to choose the first column with probability p and the second column with probability 1−p. Thus Player 1' guaranteed payoff (1 − p if A 1 is played or p if A 2 is played) is greater than his guaranteed payoff p(1 − p) in the game A(p) with lack of information on the both sides.
It is known [7] that the value V alA asy (p) is a continuous piecewise linear concave function over [0, 1] and as in the previous case V alA asy (0) = V alA 2 and V alA asy (1) = V alA 1 .
In this paper we consider a case in certain sense intermediate between I and II: both players do not know the state of the game but there is some additional information on this state besides its probability p.
For considerably complicated cases Gensbittel (for infinite action spaces) [8] and Gensbittel, Oliu-Barton, Venel (for an evolution of states) [9] deal with another intermediate informational structure: the informed player does not observe the state variable directly but receives a stochastic signal whose distribution depends on the state variable. The authors generalize several classical asymptotic results concerning zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side. Thus the number of possibilities for Player 1 to choose the automaton is of order 2 2m log m+3m while for Player 2 this number is 2 2n log n+3n . This implies that Player 1 has exponentially more options than Player 2 if m >> n. Both players know the size of automaton of the opponent.
A meaningful strategy of choosing an automaton is as follows. A player runs each automaton of appropriate size on input f (k), k = 1, 2 and chooses the one whose output is k if such exists. In our examples such an automaton exists for Player 1 but not for Player 2.
After the players have chosen their automata, the game sends the public signal f (k), k = 1, 2. This signal is received by the chosen automata which compute their responses.
The output of Automaton i is interpreted by Player i as an indication towards the state of the game A(p). Payoffs of the players are determined accordingly.
In sections 4-5 we give examples of functions f and numbers m, n depending on f such that the size m of Player 1's automaton allows him to "compute" the state of the game but the size n of Player 2's automaton is not sufficient for this purpose. Hence Player 1 learns the state of the game and the game A m,n f (p) is turning to the game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2.
Automaton
For theory of finite automata see textbooks [10, 11] ; here we give a quick overview and introduce the notation we use.
An automaton is represented by a connected labelled directed graph with a finite set of vertices
• One vertex is distinguished as a initial vertex v 0 .
• Each edge of the graph is labelled by either 0 or by 1.
• Each vertex is labelled by either 0 or by 1.
• There are exactly two edges leaving each vertex, one labelled 0 and one labelled 1.
• There is no restriction how many edges enter a vertex.
In our context a label on a vertex represents the output of the automaton which is interpreted as a state of the game. As input the automaton receives a signal which is a binary string; labels on the edges correspond to the symbols of the binary string. Next we explain how an automaton computes.
The computation of the automata proceeds as follows: the automaton receives a string s 1 . . . s l of 0's and 1's from the game.
Intuitively, we think that the automaton reads symbols one by one, starts at the initial vertex v 0 and upon reading the symbol s 1 , moves to the vertex v 1 by the unique edge labelled s 1 coming out of v 0 . Then upon reading the symbol s 2 , moves to the vertex v 2 by the unique edge labelled s 2 coming out of v 1 and so on... Thus there is a unique path of edges starting from the initial vertex v 0
such that the path from the vertex v i−1 to the vertex v i is labelled by
The output of the automaton is the label of the end vertex v l of this path.
Results. Degenerate cases
In the first two examples the automaton is degenerate because the signal consists only of 1's and thus only edges labelled 1 matter. In the first case the signal is deterministic, in the second case it is random.
Example 1: degenerate deterministic case
Consider function f (k) = 1 kn! , k = 1, 2; here 1 kn! denotes the string of 1 .
Then the output of the automaton G with n vertices is the same for two strings 1
i and 1 i+rn , where r is an integer positive number. Thus, the output is the same for any two strings whose lengths are more than n and have the same reminders modulo n .
As n divides n! for each 1 ≤ n ≤ n, we get that for any automaton of size at most n, the output is the same for the strings f (1) = 1 n! and f (2) = 1 2n! . This proves that the automaton of Player 2 can not distinguish the two strings f (1) = 1 n! and f (2) = 1 2n! . On the other hand, as m does not divide n! by the hypothesis of the theorem, it is easy to construct an automaton of size m which distinguishes these two strings, as follows.
Namely, consider the automaton such that its edges labelled by 1 form a single cycle of size m. As m does not divide n!, the reminders modulo m of the lengths of f (1) and f (2) are different, the end-vertices of the paths corresponding to the two signals are different. Now label them with different appropriate actions. Hence, this automaton correctly distinguishes the states of the game and therefore it is optimal for Player 1 to choose this automaton to be able to use the information about the state of the game.
Thus Player 1 knows the state of the game while Player 2 does not. We will show that, regardless of prior probability p, Player 2 is able to correctly guess the state of the game with probability at most 1/2 + 0.01. Indeed, as before, any automaton that Player 2 is allowed to choose has the property that there is n < n such that its output depends only on the length of the input signal modulo n . Look at the two sequences m, . . . , m 2 and m + 1, . . . m 2 + 1 modulo n . By assumption m is prime, hence n and m are coprime. Hence both sequences consist of a cycle of reminders n repeated several times, one last cycle may be not complete. Therefore each reminder modulo n is repeated either [m/n ] times or [m/n ] + 1 times. Now assume that p ≥ 1/2. The case p ≤ is analogous. Let us see whether Player 2 can reestimate the prior probability p based on his knowledge of the reminder modulo n of the length of the input signal.
If this reminder appears the same number of times in both sequences, i.e. the probability that if occurs is the same for both f (1) and f (2), then Player 2 can not reestimate the prior probability. Hence, the probabilities α 1 , respectively α 2 , that the automaton of Player 2 outputted 1 for f (1), respectively 2 for f (2), differ at most by factor ([m/n ]+ 1)/[m/n ] < 1.01, as probability α 1 , respectively α 2 , is the sum of the probabilities of the signals that make the automaton outputs 1, respectively 2.
Thus α 1 ≤ 1.01α 2 and α 2 ≤ 1.01α 1 .
Now use Bayes formula to reestimate the prior probability p of state 1
So it holds p < 1.05p. Hence in the game A 
Result. Non-degenerate random case
In the games above we considered signals consisting of only one symbol repeated many times. Much shorter signals suffice for the same effect (namely, that Player 1 can differentiate between the states but Player 2 can not) if one considers signals using at least two different symbols. Here we consider the game A m,n f (p) where a random signal f (k), k ∈ K consists of a binary string of both 0's and 1's.
For simplicity assume that m = 2 L for some integer L. To define f (1), consider the probability distribution over the set of binary strings of length L ≤ l < 2L such that the probability of a string s 1 . . . s l is 0 if s l−L = 1, and is 2 −l /L if s l−L = 0. For this distribution the probability of a string having size l is 1/L. The signal f (1) takes value according to this distribution.
Similarly, to define f (2), consider the probability distribution over the set of binary strings of length L ≤ l < 2L such that the probability of a string s 1 . . . s l is 0 if s l−L = 0, and is 2 −l /L if s l−L = 1. As before, for this distribution the probability of a string having size l is 1/L. The signal f (2) takes value according to this distribution.
Note that for the uniform distribution on binary strings of length l such that L ≤ l < 2L the probability that a string has length l is equal to 2 L−l . Observe that the signal described above is significantly shorter than in Theorem 2, namely signals of length l < 2L = 2 log 2 m are shorter than signals of length m.
Remark. The hypothesis of Theorem 3 assumes that m is substantially larger that n. For example, one may take L = 1000, ε = 0.1 and n = e 19 . Then the theorem requirements m = 2 1000 > 2 200 1000, n = e 19 < e 20 = exp(2ε 2 L) are fulfilled and m = 2 1000 ≈ 10 300 , n = e 19 ≈ 10 8 .
To prove the theorem we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let S be a set of strings of length L. Pick randomly and uniformly both an integer number k < L and a string s 1 . . . s L from S. Let p S be the probability that
Remark. One way to construct such a set where p S = 1/2 + ε is to take the set of all strings of length L starting with 1...1 repeated [2εL] times where [2εL] denotes the least integer not less than 2εL. Note that
where S 1 is the subset of strings containing more that (1/2+2ε)L occurrences of 1's; S 2 is the subset of strings containing not more than (1/2 + 2ε)L but more than (1/2+1/2ε)L occurrences of 1's. Finally, S 3 is the subset of strings containing not more than (1/2 + 1/2ε)L occurrences of 1's.
We have the following equality:
Estimating the number of k's such that s k = 1 among strings s 1 . . . s L ∈ S, we also get
Finally, by the Chernoff bound (see for example [12] )
thereby proving the lemma. Remark. Note that there is another proof of the lemma using entropy bounds (see for example [13] ). Now let us estimate how often an automaton of size n may correctly guess the state of the game, i.e. what is the probability that it outputs 1 when receiving signal f (1).
Lemma 2. An automaton of size n < 2 L exp(−2ε 2 L) guesses correctly with probability at most ε + 1/2.
Proof. The automaton has at most n states (vertices) v 1 , ..., v n . Let V i be the set of strings of length exactly L such that the automaton is in state v i after reading the string. Let p i = 1/2 + ε i be the probability the automaton guesses correctly after reading an input string whose first L bits is in V i . The automaton output depends on v i and the last l − L bits of the input string. Note that these last bits are irrelevant for the correctness of the output.
At least for some choice of the rest of the string the conditional probability of success is at least p i . Without loss of generality let this string be 1...1. Then we see by Lemma 1 that the size of
The overall probability of success is at most
We have to estimate the number of summands. First notice that we may disregard summands where ε i > 2ε as we need at least 2 ε of them to get ε/2. By a calculation similar to the calculation above, the proportion of summands where ε i < ε/2 cannot be more than 5/6. This implies that we need a number of summands of order exp(−2ε 2 L). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 3.
There is an automaton of size of order L2 2εL which guesses correctly with probability at least ε + 1/2. is labelled by 1. By construction this automaton guesses correctly if the input string has length at most L + l. If the string is longer it always outputs 1, which is correct with probability 1/2. The probability of an input string being of length at most L + l is l/L. Hence, the total probability of a correct guess is then at least 2l/L + (1 − 2l/L) ≤ 2ε + (1 − 2ε)/2 = 1/2 + ε. Proof of the Theorem 3. The structure of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. We use similar estimates on the posterior probabilities.
By Lemma 3 Player 1 can choose an automaton which always decodes the signal correctly and thus Player 1 knows the state of the game.
By Lemma 2 the automaton chosen by Player 2 guesses correctly with probability at most 1/2 + ε. Now let us calculate the posterior probabilities of state 1 of the game.
Assume Player 2's automaton pointed out to state 1 whose probability is p. Using Bayes formula the posterior probability p of state 1 can be calculated as follows:
+ ε) p( − ε + 2εp .
It is easy to verify that p ≤ p ≤ (1 + ε)p. Assume Player 2's automaton pointed out to state 2 whose probability is 1 − p. Similarly we get 1 − p ≤ 1 − p ≤ (1 + ε)(1 − p) of state 1. Hence (1 − p ) ≤ (1 + ε)(1 − p) and thus p ≥ (1 + ε)p − ε ≥ (1 − ε)p for p ≥ 1/2. Hence the game is ε-equivalent to game A asy (p ).
Conclusions
We consider zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides with a public signal about the state of the game. Supposing that Player 1's computational power is higher than that of Player 2, we give three examples of different kinds of public signal where Player 1 learns the state of the game meanwhile itis impossible for Player 2. Thus we show that a player may receive informationabout the state of a game due to a public signal and his computational resource. Note that boundedness of players's computational resources is equivalent (in a certain sense) to considering effectively computable strategies only. Hence we demonstrate that such a restriction may change the information structure of the game.
We hope to use this effect to shed some light on the open problem of existence of the value of stochastic games formulated in [14] (see also [15] ). Introduced by Shapley [16] stochastic games model dynamic interactions in which the current state of the game depends on the behavior of the players. These games are games with complete information -players know the current state of the game. We plan to construct an example of a stochastic game for which the solution does not exist in the class of effectively computable strategies.
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